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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Licensee Estoppel And Royalty Payments After
Lear: Inconsistencies Within The Lower Courts
Circumvent Lear Rationale
I.

INTRODUCTION

Article I of the Constitution' expressly provides Congress with
the authority to grant inventors exclusive rights to their discoveries
for limited periods to promote the development of new ideas and
innovations. By according the inventor-patentee the seventeen-year
right 2 either to exclude all others from making, using, or selling his
invention 3 or to contract for its limited use in the form of assignments or licenses,4 Congress has attempted to provide the initiative
and incentive necessary to encourage the continued progress of science and the arts.' Moreover, statutory safeguards, which presume
the validity of the patent until a contesting party establishes its
invalidity, protect the patentee-licensor from patent infringement
by unauthorized users.6 Although a declaration of patent invalidity
constitutes an affirmative defense for licensees to an action for pat-

1. U.S. CONsT. art I, § 8, cl. 8. "The Congress shall have power. . . to promote the
progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the
exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries."
2. Pursuant to the Constitutional grant of authority, Congress has enacted the Patent
Act, 35 U.S.C. §§1-293 (1970). Section 101 grants eligibility for patent protection to inventors
of new and useful processes, machines, and manufacture or composition of matter. See
Milgrim, Sears to Lear to Painton: Of Whales and Other Matters, 46 N.Y.U.L. REV. 17, 2729 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Milgrim]. For a good discussion of the common law origins
of patent law see Note, PatentLaw-Patent Validity: The Public is the Third Party,51 DENVER
L.J. 95 (1974).
3. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1970).
4. Note, Patent Law-Licensee Agreements, 18 VmL. L. REV. 968, 970 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Patent Law].
5. "The public benefit accruing from the grant of a patent monopoly results from the
additional incentive to invent, the stimulation of capital investment in developing the invention provided by the vision of an exclusive position, and the public disclosure of inventions
that might otherwise remain secret." Id. at 969-70 n.12.
6. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1970). A patentee-licensor is protected from unauthorized use of his
patent monopoly by a civil action for infringement. If he negotiates its use under a licensing
agreement, the licensor, in the event his licensee breaches the contract, is given the option
to sue for forfeiture of the license, for damages in either an infringement action or an action
on the contract, or for specific performance. The licensor's underlying patent is presumed
valid by statute and relief for breach of the license will be granted unless the licensee affirmatively establishes a defense sufficient to overcome the presumption. See note 4 supra.
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ent infringements or recovery of royalties,7 the availability of this
defense historically was precluded by the licensee estoppel doctrine,
which prevented a licensee from disputing the validity of the patent
he had contracted to utilize.8 Based on the settled theory of contract
law that prohibits a purchaser from repudiating a contract merely
because of subsequent dissatisfaction with the bargain, the estoppel
doctrine became increasingly in conflict with the sound public policy of challenging monopolies based on worthless patents and promoting the free circulation of ideas for public benefit Recognizing
the incongruity of these competing doctrines, the Supreme Court,
in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins,'" overruled the common-law doctrine of
licensee estoppel. Notwithstanding this purported abandonment of
the rule, the ability of a licensee to invoke patent invalidity as a
defense remains unclear.
I.

LICENSEE ESTOPPEL AND

Lear

For more than a century, the licensee estoppel doctrine prohibited licensees from contesting the validity of their licensors' patents" on the rationale that a licensee should not be permitted to
enjoy the benefits accruing from a license agreement while simultaneously urging the invalidity of the underlying patent.'2 As a purchaser could not legally repudiate his contract if he later became
dissatisfied with the subsequent bargain he made, the licensee similarly was prevented from challenging the results of his arm's-length
bargaining with the licensor.' 3 Notwithstanding this rationale, the
7. Traditionally, this defense was available only to the exclusive licensee under the
theory of failure of consideration on the contract. A nonexclusive licensee generally was
regarded as having bargained only for the right to use the patent free from an infringement
suit by his licensor and consequently was denied the failure of consideration theory. 63 YALE
L.J. 125, 126-27 (1953).
8. Note 4, supra. See Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S.
827 (1950) (holding that licensee estoppel is the "generally accepted rule"). For a discussion
of estoppel doctrine prior to its abandonment, see Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 663-71
(1969) (overruling Automatic Radio and its use of licensee estoppel as a bar to contesting
patent validity).
9. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, at 668. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225
(1964) (emphasizing strong federal policy favoring free competition in ideas that do not merit
patent protection); accord, Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
10. 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
11. Arnold & Goldstein, Life UnderLear, 48 TEx. L. REV. 1235, 1238 (1970). See Treece,
Licensee Estoppel in Patent and Trademark Cases, 53 IowA L. REv. 525, 528-30 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Licensee Estoppel].
12. See 4 A. DELLER, DELLER'S WALKER ON PATENTS § 403 (2d ed. 1965). Licensee estoppel was first introduced in the United States in Kinsman v. Parkhurst, 59 U.S. (18 How.)
289 (1856).
13. 395 U.S. at 668. See Eureka Co. v. Bailey Co., 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 488 (1871) (Court
finding a strong presumption that the denial of validity of a licensor's patent is made primarily in support of an unwillingness to pay the royalty which was agreed would be paid).
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Supreme Court began to formulate exceptions to dilute the rigidity
of the estoppel rule's application." In Pope Manufacturing Co. v.
Gormully,' 5 the Court refused to apply licensee estoppel to enforce
a licensee's contractual obligation never to contest his licensor's
patent, finding the stipulations oppressive and unreasonable and
therefore unenforceable under equity's "clean-hands doctrine."' 6
Similarly, it became the rule that once a third party proved patent
invalidity, the licensee could assert failure of consideration under
the contract as a defense to a suit by the licensor to recover royalties.'" Additionally, the estoppel doctrine was found inapplicable
when licenses contained provisions repugnant to the antitrust
laws,'" and evidence of prior art, such as related patents and publications, was also frequently admitted to narrow the scope of the
patentee's claim.' 9 In the 1950 decision of Automatic Radio Manufacturing Company v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 21 however, the
Court revived the estoppel doctrine and declared, without prolonged
analysis, that licensee estoppel remained the generally accepted
rule and barred a defense of patent invalidity by the licensee. 2'
The Hazeltine decision continued virtually undisturbed 21 until
23
overruled by the landmark 1969 decision in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins.
After granting certiorari to review the California Supreme Court's
reliance on licensee estoppel to bar manufacturer-Lear from contesting the validity of inventor-Adkin's patent on an improved
aeronautical gyroscope,2 4 the Court concluded that the strong public
interest in permitting full and free competition in unpatentable
ideas necessitated a preclusion of rigid applications of the technical
requirements of the contract doctrine. 25 The Court also considered
14. 395 U.S. at 663-68. See 63 YALE L.J. 125-31 (1953).
15. 144 U.S. 224 (1892).
16. Id. at 236-37. See 395 U.S. at 663-64.
17. See, e.g., Drackett Chemical Co. v. Chamberlain Co., 63 F.2d 853 (6th Cir. 1933);
note 7 supra.
18. See Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942) (refusing to permit

licensor to enforce licensee's price-fixing provisions without permitting licensee to contest
validity of underlying patent).
19. See Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg., Co. v. Formica Insulation Co., 266 U.S. 342 (1924)
(allowing original patent owner to attack validity of assigned patent by introducing evidence
to narrow the claims made in the patent).
20. 339 U.S. 827 (1950).
21. Id. at 836.
22. The Court, in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964), suggested, in dictum, that a state could not, under some other law, encroach upon the federal
patent laws. Accord, Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964); see
Milgrim, supra note 2, at 18.
23. 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
24. Id. at 656.
25. "Surely the equities of the licensor do not weigh very heavily when they are bal-
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whether requiring licensees to continue payment of royalties while
challenging patent validity in the courts would frustrate the federal
patent law policy favoring expeditious challenges to worthless patents. " While expressing no opinion on royalty payments made prior
to the issuance of the licensor's patents,27 the Court held, on the
basis of the particular facts at bar, that by establishing patent invalidity the licensee could avoid all royalties accruing after issuance
of the licensor's patent.2 8 The Court left unanswered, however, the
extent to which federal patent law should pre-empt countervailing
contractual policies and allow avoidance of royalty obligations.

III.

"PUBLIC POLICY"

v. LAW OF CONTRACT AFTER Lear

The failure of the Lear Court to define more adequately the
scope of its public policy analysis in licensor-licensee disputes resulted in an inconsistent application of Lear by the lower courts. In
2
Business Forms Finishing Service, Inc. v. Carson,'
the Seventh
Circuit considered whether a consent decree entered on a settlement
upholding patent validity created an estoppel to a defense of invalidity claimed by the licensee in a subsequent suit for patent infringement involving the same parties. Acknowledging the existence
of competing policy considerations favoring principles of contract
law on the one hand and public interest in free competition and
circulation of ideas on the other, the court interpreted Lear as direct
authority for holding defendant's covenant unenforceable. " Neveranced against the important public interest in permitting full and free competition in the use
of ideas which are in reality a part of the public domain . . . .We think it plain that the
technical requirements of the contract doctrine must give way before the demands of the
public interest . . . ." Id. at 670.
26. Id. at 673.
27. The question whether state trade secrets were pre-empted by federal patent law was
left unanswered until Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974), upheld their
continued validity.
28. 395 U.S. at 674.
29. 452 F.2d 70 (7th Cir. 1971). Accord, Butterfield v. Oculus Contact Lens Co., 332 F.
Supp. 750 (N.D. Ill. 1971) (finding Lear authority for overturning former consent decree
establishing patent validity).
30. The court narrowed the issue of the case to a decision whether, as a matter of
contract, the licensees should be held to their contract, and if not, whether the judicial decree
is nevertheless binding. 452 F.2d at 73. Considering the matter of contract law, the court took
notice of the same competing policy considerations reflected in common-law cases dealing
with the enforceability of covenants not to compete and in Supreme Court decisions repudiating the doctrine of licensee estoppel. Recognizing in each the underlying basis that private
settlement of disputes which adversely affect public interest in promoting free competition
cannot be accorded the full protection of the courts, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the
licensees' agreement to accept the validity of licensor's patent was unenforceable. Id. at 7375. Lastly, without considering to what extent an adjudication on the merits would affect the
finality of a judicial decree, the court determined that since the initial suit was settled before
plaintiff-licensor had rested its case, there was no actual decision on the issue of patent
validity and therefore no estoppel issue in question.
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theless, the same court, in Maxon Premix Burner Co. v. Eclipse Fuel
Engineering Co.,3 ' held Lear and Business Forms inapplicable after
finding that licensee's admissions of patent validity during trial and
its failure to raise effectively the validity issue until after judgment
constituted a waiver of any guaranteed right to contest validity in
subsequent litigation." While paying deference to the public policy
of encouraging challenges to worthless patents, the court held Lear
insufficient to overcome both the statutory presumption favoring
patent validity and the recognized public policy favoring conserva33
tion of judicial time and limitations on expensive litigation. Similarly, in Schlegel ManufacturingCo. v. King Aluminum Corp.,34 an
Ohio federal district court interpreted the public policy underpinnings of Lear as insufficient authority to allow the relitigation of the
same issue of patent invalidity involving the same parties.3 Distinguishing Business Forms as determinative only of a peculiar factual
circumstance, Schlegel found that established judicial policy and a
sense of respect for the courts required that parties not request a
judge to sign a consent decree declaring patent validity and later
attack the authority of the decree.3 This rationale assumes that a
judicial decree entered on consent of the parties is sufficiently distinguishable from the principles of contract law overturned in Lear.
The conclusion is questionable, however, because Lear's implicit
recognition of the importance of challenging licenses based on
worthless patents regardless of the origin of the initial licensing
agreement would appear to require a broad interpretation.
Settlement contracts affixing damages for alleged past infringements and establishing future contractual obligations for payment
of royalties also have been attacked under the principles of Lear. In
Ransburg Electro-CoatingCorp. v. Spiller & Spiller, Inc.,3" licensor
claimed infringement of its electrostatic sprayer patent on the basis
31. 471 F.2d 308 (7th Cir. 1972) (contesting grant of injunction barring infringement of
licensor's patent on grounds that trial court erred in refusing to make finding on patent

invalidity).
32. Id. at 312.
33. Id.
34. 369 F. Supp. 650 (S.D. Ohio 1973) (denying licensee's motion to stay contempt
proceeding initiated by licensor pending adjudication of previously litigated issue of patent
validity in a foreign jurisdiction).
35. The court held the issue of patent validity, which was settled in a prior suit under
a consent decree signed by that court, to be res judicata to the law of the instant case. Id. at
652. But see Butterfield v. Oculus Contact Lens Co., 332 F. Supp. 750 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
36. 369 F. Supp. at 653.
37. 489 F.2d 974 (7th Cir. 1973). See Systron-Donner Corp. v. Sundstrand Data Control,
Inc., BNA PATEr, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J., No. 178 at A-6 (Super. Ct. Calif. May 16,
1974) (finding Ransburgauthority for estopping licensee from contesting settlement contract
affirming patent validity).
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of a previous suit against licensee's former supplier that had upheld
the validity of licensor's patent and found patent infringement.38
Viewing similar unfavorable disposition as inevitable, Spiller, in
two separate agreements, contracted to pay both damages for any
and all infringements and royalties for a future licensing agreement
that would entitle it to continue marketing Ransburg's patented
product as a licensee. Three years later, the Fourth Circuit overruled the finding of infringement by Spiller's former supplier39 and
Spiller thereafter discontinued all damage payments under the settlement agreement. When sued only for breach of the settlement
contract," licensee, nevertheless, raised the defense of patent invalidity and counterclaimed for recoupment of all monies paid under
both the settlement contract and the licensing agreement." Reversing the district court's opinion that the public policy principles
enunciated in Lear precluded the court's enforcement of settlement
contracts, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that since the settlement
agreement existed separately from the licensing contract, enforcement of the former would not be contrary to the sound policy of
contesting worthless patents because the invalidity of the patent
would preclude enforcement of the licensing agreement." Construing Lear to be representative of a compromise between "technical"
requirements of contract law and policies of federal patent law, the
court maintained that the fundamental principles favoring expedient and orderly settlement of bona fide claims and the fostering of
43
judicial economy required that settlement contracts be upheld.
38. Ransburg brought an action in the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland against Ionic, Inc., the manufacturer and vendor of the Ionic Models 25 and M50
Electro-static Sprayers utilized by Spiller, claiming that the Ionic Model M50 atomizer
infringed Ransburg's patents. Ransburg Electro-Coating Corp. v. Proctor Elec. Co., 317 F.2d
302 (4th Cir. 1963). In a separate but related action, Ionic was cited for contempt of the
injunctive provisions of the prior decree, for manufacturing and selling the Ionic Model 25
atomizer. 242 F. Supp. 28 (D. Md. 1965). Shortly thereafter Ransburg and Spiller entered
into the settlement contract discussed in text.
39. The Fourth Circuit held that the Ionic Model 25 did not infringe Ransburg's patents. Ransburg Electro-Coating Corp. v. Ionic Electrostatic Corp., 395 F.2d 92 (4th Cir. 1968).
40. Ransburg initiated suit to recover the balance due on the settlement contract and
did not contest Spiller's infringement of the licensing agreement for nonpayment of royalties.
41. 489 F.2d at 976. In addition, Spiller filed a third-party complaint against Ionic,
asserting various theories of indemnification. Although dismissed by the district court, the
instant court reversed and remanded for reconsideration in light of its decision upholding the
settlement contract. Id. at 979.
42. Basically, Spiller contended that the settlement contract and the license comprised
one license agreement to continue production of the product, and, under the principles of
Lear, the Fourth Circuit's finding of non-infringement by Ionic, precluded the enforcement
of the settlement agreement.
43. "Although the federal patent policy prevails over the 'technical requirements of
contract doctrine' . . . we believe that such policy must occupy a subsidiary position to the

19751

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

The Seventh Circuit's pronouncements favoring established principles of contract law proved, however, less than definitive.
In Kraly v. National Distillers & Chemical Corp.,44 licensor
alleged patent infringement and contended that previous litigation
with licensee's predecessor-in-interest upholding the validity of licensor's patent was res judicata on the issue of validity of licensor's
patent in a subsequent suit with the present licensee." Although
admitting that a dismissal with prejudice in a prior suit generally
had conclusive effect on the rights of parties or their privies in
subsequent litigation on the same issue, the Seventh Circuit held
that the principles of Lear and Business Forms constituted persuasive authority for dismissing the estoppel effect of res judicata if
found in direct conflict with the public policy of avoiding worthless
patents. Extending the rationale of Lear beyond that previously
expressed in Business Forms,4" the court suggested that even if the
issue of patent validity has received a full adjudication on its merits,
doubt existed whether, in light of Lear, parties could consent to a
determination of infringement or patent validity and create another
barrier to the federal principles of ridding the public of worthless
patent monopolies. Concluding, the court distinguished its
Ransburg decision with a less than persuasive argument that a significant difference exists between avoiding present licensing agreements incorporating invalid underlying patents and a court's refusing to invalidate contract settlements for past infringements that
later prove unfounded. 7 This distinction lacks consistency because
the settlement contract upheld in Ransburg is no less a contract
based on a worthless patent than the consent decree appropriately
overturned in Kraly and therefore should not be afforded dissimilar
treatment.
fundamental policy favoring the expedient and orderly settlement of disputes and the fostering of judicial economy." 489 F.2d at 978.
44. 502 F.2d 1366 (7th Cir. 1974).
45. In the prior suit with National's predecessor-in-interest, H. B. Egan Mfg. Co., a
dismissal without prejudice was requested of the court upon agreement of the settlement
contract recognizing the validity of licensor-Kraly's patent and providing for a nonexclusive
licensing agreement under which Egan would pay royalties. Nevertheless, the court dismissed
with prejudice stating that the parties, by agreement, had made full settlement of all claims
for infringement, with Egan taking a license under the Kraly patent. Id. at 1368.
46. In Business Forms, the court avoided this issue by ruling that no final adjudication
had been made on the merits of patent invalidity.
47. Within this analysis is the misconception that a settlement contract negotiated
between two parties affects only the rights of those parties. This argument fails to consider
that the cost of the licensee's damages paid to the licensor for alleged infringements of a
patent that was actually invalid ultimately must be shifted to the public as consumers.
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IV.

ROYALTY PAYMENTS AFTER

Lear

Determining that continued payment of royalties by the licensee prior to final adjudication of patent validity would defeat the
federal patent policy favoring expeditious and early challenges to
worthless patents, the Court in Lear held that the licensee could
avoid payment of royalties after patent issuance if it proved patent
invalidity. 8 The Court, however, left undecided the question of recoupment of funds expended by the licensee on a patent agreement
subsequently found invalid. When confronted with defendant's
counterclaim for refund of all monies paid under the settlement
contract and licensing agreement, the district court in Ransburg"
narrowly interpreted Lear to allow nonpayment of royalties from the
time of suit and not recoupment of sums paid from the time of

patent issuance.50 Although not reaching the merits of the argument
on appeal,5 the Seventh Circuit apparently accepted the lower
court's interpretation when, in Kraly,52 it adopted the similar findings of the Sixth Circuit in Troxel Manufacturing Co. v. Schwinn
Bicycle Co.53 In Troxel, the court refused licensee's claim for recoupment of royalties paid on an underlying patent that later proved
invalid, reasoning that to allow recoupment would place licensors
in the disadvantageous position of facing inevitable suits by licensees who could enjoy the benefits of the patentee's discoveries while
seeking refund of the costs of their bargain.54 Carrying this rationale
48. The licensing agreement was signed by the parties with the understanding that
licensor would seek patent approval. After his application was twice rejected by the Office of
Patents, licensee terminated all royalty payments due under the contract. Upon reapplication, licensor successfully patented his invention, thereafter initiating the instant suit for
patent infringement.
49. 340 F. Supp. 1385 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
50. Id. at 1392.
51. Since the Seventh Circuit upheld the settlement contract, the counterclaim for
monies expended was moot.
52. Finding " . . . Ransburg properly distinguishes between the refusal of courts to
enforce prospectively the terms of a licensing agreement when the underlying patent has been
declared invalid and the appropriate use of judicial power to enforce the terms of a licensing
agreement during the period prior to an adjudication of invalidity in which both parties
benefited from the agreement. . . ," the court explicitly adopted the Sixth Circuit's decision
refusing recoupment of royalties expended prior to adjudication of patent invalidity. 503 F.2d
at 1372.
53. 465 F.2d 1253 (6th Cir. 1972). Under the licensing agreement with licensee Troxel
to contest all infringements by nonlicensed users, licensor Schwinn initiated suit against
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., which resulted in a finding by the court of patent invalidity.
While initially attempting to pay royalties into escrow pending appeal by Schwinn, licensee
nevertheless acquiesced and made full royalty payments to licensor until the decision of
patent invalidity was affirmed. Thereafter, released from its licensing agreement, licensee
commenced suit against Schwinn for recoupment of royalties paid. See Patent Law, supra
note 4, at 968-69.
54. Id. at 1260. The court found that Troxel could cease payment of royalties and be
secure within the guise of Lear of a valid defense to a suit for infringement.
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to an illogical extreme, the recent decision of Morton-Norwich Products, Inc. v. International Salt Co.,5" exemplifies the two-edged
sword a licensee will likely face if he chooses to contest the validity
of his licensor's patent. In that case the licensee suspended royalty
payments and sued the licensor seeking a judgment of patent invalidity and recoupment of royalties paid. Defendant licensor counterclaimed, alleging patent infringement for failure to pay royalties
under the licensing contract. Rejecting licensee's contention that,
under Lear, a licensee withholding royalties pending final determination of patent validity could not be sued for breach of contract,
the court concluded that the licensor, having granted the right to
use his presumptively valid patent,56 could not, as a matter of law,
be precluded from receiving his benefits due under the contract,
and, at the same time, be denied relief against the infringing licensee. Accordingly, the licensee, contesting the validity of his licensor's patent, faces the choice of either withholding all royalty payments and chancing a counterclaim for breach of contract or paying
the royalties and, under Kraly and Troxel, being denied recoupment
of funds expended prior to determination of patent validity.
V.

CONCLUSION

Although the Supreme Court sought to end the doctrine of licensee estoppel, the rule continues to exist in the lower courts' inconsistent and contradictory interpretations of the Lear decision.
While correctly applying Lear to overturn consent decrees incorporating covenants attesting to patent validity, the Seventh Circuit
has denied the same application to settlement contracts that later
prove to be based on unworthy claims of patent infringement. Contending that challenges to settlement contracts would do little toward furthering the "collateral policy" in Lear favoring early challenges to worthless patents, the court has reasoned that successful
challenges of settlements would compel infringers to accept a settlement and await another licensee's test of the licensor's patent rather
than to challenge the patent himself during settlement negotiation. 7 Although a licensee may exhibit a stronger inclination to
allow another to expend the enormous amounts of money necessary
to contest a patent's validity, 8 it does not necessarily follow that the
55. BNA PATENT,

TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT

J., No. 188 at A-13 (N.D.N.Y. June 26,

1974).

56. See note 6 supra.
57. Ransburg Electro-Coating Corp. v. Spiller & Spiller, Inc., 489 F.2d 974, 978 (7th
Cir. 1973).
58. The average cost involved in litigating the validity of a patent is about $50,000.
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scrupulous upholding of settlement contracts promotes contests of
patent validity. Generally, a party agrees to accept an unfavorable
settlement only when he believes that his adversary holds a stronger
position than his own. Thus, a licensee under circumstances similar
to those in Business Forms and Kraly may enter a consent decree
covenanting not to contest his licensor's patent in order to gain the
most beneficial compromise he feels possible. For identical reasons,
a licensee may enter a settlement similar to the one in Ransburg and
if the underlying patent proves worthless, no more reason exists for
allowing avoidance of the consent decree than for overturning a
settlement based on infringements that in fact never occurred.59
Similarly, the decision in Morton-Norwich0 seems unjustified.
Lear purported to relieve the licensee of the burden of paying royalties that he might not recover while contesting the validity of the
licensor's patent. By allowing the licensor to sue for infringement for
nonpayment of royalties when the licensee seeks to apply the principles of Lear, the lower court circumvented the Lear rationale and
defeated its purpose of challenging monopolies based on worthless
patents and promoting the free circulation of ideas for the public
benefit.
Clearly, the Supreme Court must promulgate definitive guidelines to resolve the controversy stemming from the inconsistent application of Lear. Nevertheless, it is asserted that while the extent
of the Lear analysis is less than conclusive, much of the controversy
within the lower courts is unwarranted. The Court, reversing the
common-law doctrine of licensee estoppel, expressly recognized the
federal patent law policy of contesting worthless patents as the basis
for allowing expeditious challenges by the licensee to a licensor's
underlying patent. Rejecting the contention that the principles of
contract law precluded an avoidance of the licensing agreement, the
Court formulated sound precedent for overturning consent decrees
and settlement contracts which similarly attempt to restrict challenges to invalid patents. Furthermore, Lear sought to protect the
licensee's right to challenge by allowing the litigant to withhold all
royalty payments to the licensor pending final adjudication of patent validity. Logically Lear also would disallow suit by licensor for
patent infringement for nonpayment of those royalties due.
HENRY

P.

DOGGRELL

Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 335
(1971). See Patent Law, supra note 4, at 973 n.37 (1973).
59. See also note 47 supra.
60. See note 55 supra.

